ParaRegs-Disability-General Disability Rules
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1301 Z53 /
Federal v. State authority |
1305 County / DED responsibilities 1308 General definitions / Glossary |
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Code |
Effective |
ParaReg Text |
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Disability may be verified by a Social Security Administration
(SSA) Title II award letter which shows current receipt of benefits and no
reexamination date or a reexamination date in the future, or an SSA Title II
increase or decrease notice, or a signed statement from the SSA which
indicates that the applicant is eligible to Social Security benefits based on
disability. (§50167(a)(1)(B)) |
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1300-2 |
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The Social Security Administration (SSA) makes disability
determinations based on social security law.
A disability determination by any other governmental or
nongovernmental agency is not binding on the SSA. (POMS DI 24515.011) |
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1301-2 |
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Federal law provides that a State plan may provide for the
making of determinations of disability or blindness for the purpose of
determining eligibility for medical assistance under the State plan by the
single State agency or its designees, and make medical assistance available
to individuals whom it finds to be blind or disabled and who are disabled or
otherwise eligible for such assistance during the time period prior to which
a final determination of disability or blindness is made by the Social
Security Administration (SSA) with respect to such an individual. In making such determinations, the State
must apply the definitions of disability and blindness found in Section
1614(a) of the Social Security Act.
(42 |
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1301-3 |
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The CDHS has instructed counties as follows: Due to the
numerous levels of appeals and extensive backlogs in Social Security
Administration (SSA) hearings, beneficiaries could receive Medi-Cal for
several years before a final decision is rendered. "A decision becomes 'FINAL' when the
beneficiary does not or cannot appeal the termination of Title II or SSI/SSP
disability benefits any further.
Medi-Cal benefits will continue through the 65-day period following
the denial of an appeal in which the next level of appeal can be filed."
(All-County Welfare Directors Letter No. 97-28, June 23, 1997, p. 5) |
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Verification of disability may be made in accordance with
procedures established by the Disability and Adult Programs Division (DAPD),
formerly known as the Disability Evaluation Division (DED) of the California
Department of Social Services. Except
in the event of a delay due to circumstances beyond the control of the
county, all necessary information shall be submitted to DAPD within 10 days
after the county's receipt of the Statement of Facts. (§50167(a)(1)(D); All-County Welfare Directors
Letter No. 97-54, |
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1302-2 |
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The DED (now called the DAPD) evaluates disability and
prepares a rationale explaining the basis for the decision when the person is
determined not disabled. The rationale
for the denial is sent to the county attached to the form MC 221. These rationales must be attached to any
denial notice sent to the applicant.
The denial notice must state that the application is denied due to
lack of disability and refer the applicant to the attachment for further
explanation. Notices which do not
contain the rationale constitute inadequate notice. Do not attach any other documents,
including the MC 221, as such documents are not written for clients and are
confusing and/or misleading to the applicant.
(All-County Welfare Directors Letter (ACWDL) No. 86-52, September 29,
1986; Visser v. Kizer) |
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1302-3 |
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The Social Security Administration (SSA) issued an
Acquiescence Ruling (AR) implementing Chavez
v. Bowen. AR 97-4(9) was published on 12/03/97, to
explain how the decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Chavez will be applied within this
circuit. The court in Chavez concluded that a final decision
of the Commissioner after a hearing by an administrative law judge (ALJ) that
found the claimant not disabled gives rise to a presumption that the claimant
continues to be not disabled after the period adjudicated, and that this
presumption of continuing nondisability applies when adjudicating a
subsequent disability claim with an unadjudicated period arising under the
same title of the Act as the prior claim.
In order to rebut the presumption of continuing nondisability, a
claimant must prove "changed circumstances" affecting the issue of
disability with respect to the unadjudicated period. The court further indicated that where the claimant rebuts
the presumption by proving a "changed circumstance," the
Commissioner then must give effect to certain findings contained in the final
decision on the prior claim in determining whether the claimant is disabled with
respect to the unadjudicated period involved in the subsequent claim. The court concluded that where such final
decision on the prior claim contained findings of the claimant's residual
functional capacity (RFC), education, and work experience, the Commissioner
may not make different findings in adjudicating the subsequent disability
claim unless there is new and material evidence relating to the claimant's
RFC, education, or work experience.
(POMS DI 32720.001B., implementing AR 97-4(9)) This AR applies at the initial, reconsideration, ALJ, or
Appeals Council (AC) level when the following are met: * The adjudicator is deciding a
subsequent disability claim with an unadjudicated period arising under the
same title of the Act as a prior disability claim, and * There was a decision by an ALJ or
the AC on the prior disability claim that the claimant was not disabled
(i.e., that the individual did not become disabled or that the individual's
disability had ceased, see POMS DI 32720.010B.3) and this decision has become
final, and * The final decision by the ALJ or AC
that the claimant was not disabled was based on the individual's work
activity or earnings, on an evaluation of the medical evidence of the
individual's impairments alone, or on a consideration of both medical and
vocational factors, and was not based on the individual's failure to
cooperate, failure to follow prescribed treatment, or whereabouts unknown,
and * The
claimant resides in, e.g., California. (POMS DI 32720.005) A claimant may rebut the presumption of continuing
nondisability by showing a "changed circumstance" affecting the
issue of disability with respect to the unadjudicated period. A "changed circumstance" refers
to a change in the circumstances on which the ALJ or the AC based the final
decision that the claimant was not disabled.
(POMS DI 32720.010A.3) |
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1302-4 |
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All the regulations cited refer to the Manual of Policies
and Procedures (MPP), unless otherwise noted. Section 22-009.1 provides that a request for hearing must
be filed within 90 days of the action with which the claimant is
dissatisfied. If the claimant received adequate notice of the action, the
date of the action is the date the notice was mailed to the claimant. Section 22-001(c)(5) defines a county action as one which
requires adequate notice, as well as any other county action or inaction
relating to the claimant’s application for or receipt of aid. Section 22-021.1 provides that the county is required to
provide adequate notice when aid is granted, increased, denied, decreased,
suspended, canceled or discontinued. Adequate notice must also be provided
when the county demands repayment of an overpayment or Food Stamp
overissuance. Adequate notice is defined as written notice informing the
claimant of the action that the county intends to take, the reasons for the
intended action, the specific regulations supporting such action, an
explanation of the claimant’s right to request a state hearing, and if
appropriate, the circumstances under which aid will be continued if a hearing
is requested. When appropriate, the notice shall also inform the claimant
regarding what information or action, if any, is needed to reestablish
eligibility or determine a correct amount of aid. In all cases, the notice is
to be prepared on a standard form approved by the State Department of Social
Services. The notice shall be prepared in clear, nontechnical language and
shall be mailed or given to the claimant in duplicate. See also §22-001(a). A request for hearing shall be dismissed if the request
for hearing is filed beyond the time limit set forth in §22-009. (§22-054.32) |
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1302-5 |
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In Udd v. Massanari, the 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals reviewed the petitioner’s claim that he was entitled to review a
discontinuance of his Social Security disability benefits on October 31,
1976. The petitioner sought
reinstatement of his benefits effective November 1, 1976, even though he had
not filed an appeal on the discontinuance for more than 15 years. The reason for the late filing was that the
petitioner allegedly lacked the mental capacity to understand the termination
notice, and he had no person to represent him. The Appeals Court agreed with these
contentions, determined the filing was timely, and order benefits restored
effective November 1, 1976. The basis for this conclusion - as to the timely filing -
is set forth in the analysis below: "It is axiomatic that due
process requires that a claimant receive meaningful notice and an opportunity
to be heard before his claim for disability benefits may be denied. Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333
(1976). Udd argues that the 1976
termination of benefits denied him due process of law because his mental
impairment prevented him from understanding the order of termination and
complying with the administrative review process. "In 1991, SSA issued Ruling
91-5p ('SSR 91-5p'), which provides that if a claimant presents evidence that
mental incapacity prevented him from requesting timely review of an
administrative action, and the claimant had no one legally responsible for
prosecuting the claim on his behalf at the time of the prior adverse action,
SSA ‘will determine whether or not good cause exists for extending the time
to request review.' SSR' 91-5p. 'The claimant will have established mental
incapacity for the purpose of establishing good cause when the evidence
establishes that he or she lacked the mental capacity to understand the
procedures for requesting review.' SSR
91-5p. In making the 91-5p
determination, the following four factors must be considered: (1) inability to read or write; (2) lack of
facility with the English language; (3) limited education; and (4) any mental
or physical condition which limits the claimant's ability to do things for
him/herself. SSR 91-5p. In all cases, '[t]he adjudicator will
resolve any reasonable doubt in favor of the claimant.' SSR 91-5p. "If it is determined, applying the proper criteria,
that the claimant lacked the mental capacity to understand the procedures for
requesting review, time limits are tolled 'regardless of how much time has
passed since the prior administrative action.' SSR 91-5p.
In such cases, the adjudicator must 'take the action which would have
been appropriate had the claimant filed a timely request for review.' SSR 91-5p.
Thus, 'a finding of good cause [to extend the time for review] will
result either in a determination or decision that is subject to further
administrative or judicial review of the claim, or a dismissal (for reasons
other than late filing) of the request for review, as appropriate.' SSR 91-5p." (Udd v. Massanari, supra, (2001) 245 F.3d
1096, 1098) |
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Federal law provides, generally, it is the responsibility
of the applicant to prove his or her disability. (20 CFR §416.912) |
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1303-2 |
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Federal law provides that if the applicant does not
provide evidence needed and requested regarding disability, a decision will
be made based on information available in the case. (20 CFR §416.916) |
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1303-3 |
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Federal law provides that if an applicant does not have a
good reason for failing or refusing to take part in a consultative
examination, he or she is subject to a determination that no disability
exists. Good reasons for failure to
appear include illness on the date of the test, inadequate notice of the
scheduled examination or test, inadequate information about the physician
involved, or the applicant having had death or serious illness occur in the
immediate family. (20 CFR §416.918) |
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1303-4 |
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Federal law states that in order to receive benefits, the
applicant or recipient must follow treatment prescribed by her physician if
this treatment can restore her ability to work. When the applicant or recipient does not
follow the prescribed treatment without a good reason, then she will not be
found to be disabled. Acceptable
reasons for failure to follow prescribed treatment are as follows: (1) The
specific medical treatment is contrary to the established teaching and tenets
of the applicant or recipient's religion. (2) The treatment would be cataract
surgery for one eye under certain conditions. (3) Surgery was previously
performed with unsuccessful results and the same surgery is again being
recommended for the same impairment. (4) The treatment because of its
magnitude (e.g., open heart surgery), unusual nature (e.g., organ transplant),
or other reason is very risky. (5) The
treatment involves amputation of an extremity or a major part of an
extremity. (20 CFR §416.930) |
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1303-5 |
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Obesity is not necessarily a remediable condition. It can be considered a contributing factor
in determining disability. While a
claimant's “impairments can be improved by simply following a doctor's orders
to lose weight, losing weight is a task which is not equivalent to taking
pills or following a prescription.” (Hammock v. Bowen (1989) 867 F. 2d 1209, 1215) An ALJ cannot assume that obesity is remediable, and deny
a claim based on failure to follow prescribed medical treatment, as required
by 20 CFR §416.930. The fact that a
particular claimant had lost weight in the past does not establish that weight
loss is feasible; rather, the fact that the claimant could not keep the
weight off suggests the condition may not be remediable. The “ALJ was required to examine the
medical conditions and personal factors that bear on whether Dodrill [the
claimant] can reasonably remedy her obesity.”
(Dodrill v. Shalala (1993) 12 F. 3d 915, 919
citing Hamock v. Bowen, supra) |
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1303-6 |
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Before failure to follow prescribed treatment for obesity
can become an issue in a case, one must first find that the individual is disabled
because of obesity or a combination of obesity and another
impairment(s). 20 CFR §416.930
provides that, in order to get benefits, an individual must follow treatment
prescribed by his or her physician if the treatment can restore the ability
to work, unless the individual has an acceptable reason for failing to follow
the prescribed treatment. SSA will
rarely use "failure to follow prescribed treatment" for obesity to
deny or cease benefits. Social Security Ruling (SSR) 82-59 "Titles II and
XVI: Failure To Follow Prescribed
Treatment," explains that failure to follow prescribed treatment exists
when all of the following conditions are present: - The individual has an impairment(s)
that meets the definition of disability, including the duration requirement,
and - A treating source has prescribed
treatment that is clearly expected to restore the ability to engage in
substantial gainful activity, and - The evidence shows that the
individual has failed to follow prescribed treatment without a good reason. If an individual who is disabled because of obesity (alone
or in combination with another impairment(s)) does not have a treating source
who has prescribed treatment for the obesity, there is no issue of failure to
follow prescribed treatment. The treatment must be prescribed by a treating source, as
defined in 20 CFR §416.902, not simply recommended. A treating source's statement that an
individual "should" lose weight or has "been advised" to
get more exercise is not prescribed treatment. When a treating source has prescribed treatment for
obesity, the treatment must clearly be expected to improve the impairment to
the extent that the person will not be disabled. The goals of treatment for obesity are generally
modest, and treatment is often ineffective.
Therefore, do not find failure to follow prescribed treatment unless
there is clear evidence that treatment would be successful. The obesity must be expected to improve to
the point at which the individual would not meet the definition of disability,
considering not only the obesity, but any other impairment(s). Finally, even if it is found that a treating source has
prescribed treatment for obesity, that the treatment is clearly expected to
restore the ability to engage in SGA, and that the individual is not
following the prescribed treatment, consider whether the individual has a
good reason for doing so. In making
this finding, follow the guidance in regulations and SSR 82-59, which provide
that acceptable justifications for failing to follow prescribed treatment
include, but are not limited to, the following: - The specific medical treatment is
contrary to the teaching and tenets of the individual's religion. - The individual is unable to afford
prescribed treatment that he or she is willing to accept, but for which free
community resources are unavailable. - The treatment carries a high degree
of risk because of the enormity or unusual nature of the procedure. In this regard, most health insurance plans and Medicare
do not defray the expense of treatment for obesity. Thus, an individual who might benefit from
behavioral or drug therapy might not be able to afford it. Also, because not enough is known about the
long-term effects of medications used to treat obesity, some people may be
reluctant to use them due to the potential risk. Because of the risks and potential side effects of surgery
for obesity, do not find that an individual has failed to follow prescribed
treatment for obesity when the prescribed treatment is surgery. (SSR No. 00-03p; POMS DI 24570.001B.) |
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The ALJ has the
duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the
applicant's interests are considered "...even when the claimant is
represented by counsel." (Brown v. Heckler (1983) 713 F.2d 441, 443; Smolen v. Chater (1996)
80 F. 3d 1273) |
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1304-1A |
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The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals has required that the ALJ
in a social security case develop the record, even when the claimant is
represented. There is a heightened
duty when the claimant is mentally ill.
As the Court said: “The ALJ in a social security
case has an independent ’duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to
assure that the claimant's interests are considered.’ Smolen,
80 F.3d at 1288 (quoting Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir.
1983)). This duty extends to the represented as well as to the unrepresented
claimant. Id. When the claimant is unrepresented, however, the AU must be
especially diligent in exploring for all the relevant facts. Cox v. Califano, 587 F.2d 988, 991 (9th Cir. 1978). In this case,
Tonapetyan was represented, but by a lay person rather than an attorney. The
ALJ's duty to develop the record fully is also heightened where the claimant
may be mentally ill and thus unable to protect her own interests. Higbee v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir.1992). Ambiguous evidence,
or the ALJ's own finding that the record is inadequate to allow for proper
evaluation of the evidence, triggers the ALJ's duty to ‘conduct an
appropriate inquiry.’ Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288; Armstrong v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 160 F.3d 587, 590 (9th
Cir.1998). The ALJ may discharge this duty in several ways, including:
subpoenaing the claimants physicians, submitting questions to the claimants
physicians, continuing the hearing, or keeping the record open after the
hearing to allow supplementation of the record. Tidwell v. Apfel, 161
F.3d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1998); Smolen,
80 F.3d at 1288.” (Tonapetyan v. Halter (2001) 242 F. 3d 1144, 1150) |
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1304-2 |
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An ALJ must give clear reasons for rejecting the
credibility of pain testimony, supported by the record. Medication side
effects, like pain, are idiosyncratic phenomena. To reject the existence of
described severity of side effects, the ALJ just give clear reasons,
supported by the record. (Varney v. Secretary (I) (1988) 846 F.2d 581, 584-586) |
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1304-3 |
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An ALJ is not bound by the uncontroverted opinions of the
applicant's physicians on the ultimate issue of disability, but cannot reject
them without presenting clear and convincing reasons for doing so. Neither
personal observations by the ALJ at the hearing nor the inability of the
reporting physicians to support their opinions with objective findings
constitutes the required clear and convincing reasons to reject
uncontroverted opinions. The ALJ's personal observations are especially
inadequate to rebut expert opinions in a case involving psychiatric
impairment. (Montijo v. Secretary
(1984) 729 F.2d 599, 601-602) |
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1304-4 |
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Where the evidence is susceptible of more than one rational
interpretation, it is the ALJ's conclusion which must be upheld. In making
findings, the ALJ is entitled to draw inferences logically flowing from the
evidence. Sample v. Schweiker (1982) 694 F.2d 639. |
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1304-5 |
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Vocational conclusions reached by an ALJ, without
testimony or evidence from a vocational expert, represented an improper
reliance upon information outside the record, deprived the applicant of an
opportunity to cross-examine or rebut, and lacked sufficient support to
constitute substantial evidence. Burkhart
v. Bowen (1988) 856 F.2d 1335. |
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1304-6 |
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It was reversible error when the ALJ denied the disability
claim based on the fact there were no limitations which prevented the
claimant from performing his past work when the ALJ failed to find that the
claimant's impairment did not meet or equal a listing. (Fanning v. Bowen (1987)
827 F.2d 631.) |
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1304-7 |
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When resolving a conflict between the opinions of a
treating physician and an examining physician, the opinion of the treating
physician is entitled to greater weight, and may be rejected only on the
basis of findings setting forth specific, legitimate reasons based on
substantial evidence in the record. (Sprague v. Bowen (1987) 812 F.2d 1226, 1230)
The opinions of treating physicians are entitled to greater weight
than "one-shot" consultants since the treating doctor is
"employed to cure" and has a greater opportunity to observe and
know the applicant as an individual. (Murray v. Heckler (1983) 722 P.2d 499, 502) |
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1304-8 |
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Where a treating physician states an opinion which is
uncontradicted and which rests on substantial medical evidence, such opinion
shall not be disregarded by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) unless clear
and convincing reasons for doing so are set forth. An ALJ must accept the treating physician's
opinion in the absence of clear and convincing reasons to reject it. (Davis
v. Heckler, (1989) 868 F.2d 323; Lester v. Chater (1996) 81 F. 3d 821; Magallanes
v. Bowen (1989) 881 F. 2d 747) When the ALJ had pointed to specific examples where the
treating physician's reported level of the claimant's impairment was not
consistent with the claimant's described symptoms, and the ALJ had also
pointed to inconsistencies between the reports of the treating physicians,
his detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical
evidence entitled him to reject the treating physicians' opinions. (Morgan
v. Commisioner (1999) 169 F. 3d
595) |
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1304-9 |
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In
general, the extent to which an individual's statements about symptoms can be
relied upon as probative evidence in determining whether the individual is
disabled depends on the credibility of the statements. When evaluating the credibility of an
individual's statements, the adjudicator must consider the entire case record
and give specific reasons for the weight given to the individual's
statements. The
finding on the credibility of the individual's statements cannot be based on
intangible or intuitive notions about an individual's credibility. The reasons for the credibility finding
must be grounded in the evidence and articulated in the determination or
decision. It is not sufficient to make
a conclusory statement that "the individual's allegations have been
considered" or that "the allegations are (or are not)
credible." It is also not enough
for the adjudicator simply to recite the factors that are described in the
regulations for evaluating symptoms.
The determination or decision must contain specific reasons for the
finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in the case record, and
must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any
subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual's
statements and the reasons for that weight.
This documentation is necessary in order to give the individual a full
and fair review of his or her claim, and in order to ensure a well-reasoned
determination or decision. The
adjudicator may find all, only some, or none of an individual's allegations
to be credible. The adjudicator may
also find an individual's statements, such as statements about the extent of
functional limitations or restrictions due to pain or other symptoms, to be
credible to a certain degree. For
example, an adjudicator may find credible an individual's statement that the
abilities to lift and carry are affected by symptoms, but find only partially
credible the individual's statements as to the extent of the functional
limitations or restrictions due to symptoms; e.g., that the individual's
abilities to lift and carry are compromised, but not to the degree alleged. A
finding that an individual's statements are not credible, or not wholly
credible, is not in itself sufficient to establish that the individual is not
disabled. All of the evidence in the
case record, including the individual's statements, must be considered before
a conclusion can be made about disability. Assessment
of the credibility of an individual's statements must be based on a
consideration of all of the evidence in the case record. This includes: The medical
signs and laboratory findings. Diagnosis,
prognosis, and other medical opinions. Statements and reports from the
individual and from treating or examining physicians or psychologists and
other persons about the individual's medical history, treatment and response,
prior work record and efforts to work, daily activities, and other
information concerning the individual's symptoms and how the symptoms affect
the individual's ability to work. The
adjudicator must also consider any observations about the individual recorded
by SSA employees during interviews, whether in person or by telephone. When the individual attends an
administrative proceeding, the adjudicator may also consider personal
observations of the individual as part of the overall evaluation of the
credibility of the individual's statements. |